The interplay of predictive and postdictive components of experienced selfhood.
Objects that we affect by our body movements can be experienced as being controlled by (agency) and belonging to the own body (ownership). Such impressions of minimal selfhood arise when objects move as predicted prior to the action (predictive component). But they can also arise when otherwise unpredictable object movements turn out to be consistent with (e.g. spatially compatible to) preceding actions (postdictive component). Here we studied how the impact of postdictive components of inferred minimal selfhood in terms of action-object compatibility is shaped by different levels of predictability of these object movements. We found that compatibility between actions and object movements, and to a lesser extent predictability of object movements, affected reported agency while only compatibility affected reported ownership. Importantly, predictive and postdictive factors influenced these measures in an independent manner. We discuss these results against the background of models that assume multiple components of experienced minimal selfhood.